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A "Conservative" Judge and the First Amendment:
JudiCial Restraint and Freedom of Expression
DANIEL 0. CONKLE*
"To whatever extent we err, .. . it must be in favor of preserving the
values of free expression .... "
Judge Edward Allen Tammi
Edward Allen Tamm did not like labels. He saw himself as neither a "con-
servative" nor a "liberal," but only as a judge. In one important respect, how-
ever, Judge Tamm was indeed a "conservative" judge: he consistently advocated
and practiced judicial restraint-a philosophy of judging built upon skepticism
of one's own ability to formulate public policy and to make decisions that might
be better made by others.2
Over the course of his judicial career, Judge Tamm authored opinions in four
landmark first amendment cases: Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,3 Buckley v.
Valeo,4 Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,5 and Columbia Broadcasting System v.
FCC.6 The United States Supreme Court ultimately decided each of these cases,
but there was no Supreme Court precedent to dictate their resolution when they
were before the District of Columbia Circuit. As a result, these cases provide a
unique opportunity to evaluate the first amendment philosophy of Judge Edward
Allen Tamm.7
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. Clerk to Judge
Tamm, 1979-1980. The author thanks Patrick L. Baude for his helpful comments on an earlier version of
this article and Maureen Straub Kordesh for her research assistance.
1. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Tamm, J., separate opinion), rev'd, 438
U.S. 726 (1978).
2. See, eg., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1547 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(Tamm, J., dissenting) (arguing constitutional challenge to operation of military training center in Hondu-
ras nonjusticiable because "[t]he conduct of foreign affairs and the proper disposition of military power
are, without question, subjects committed to the exclusive authority of the political branches of govern-
ment"), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985); Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 838-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Tamm,
J., dissenting) (noting importance of "case or controversy" limitation on judicial power and arguing public
school students lacked standing to challenge Internal Revenue Service practices with respect to racial
discrimination by private schools), rev'd, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); American Radio Relay League v. FCC, 617
F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Tamm, J.) (explaining and emphasizing importance of judicial deference
to rulemaking by administrative agencies).
3. 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Tamm, J., separate opinion), aff'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
4. 519 F.2d 821, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
5. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Tamm, J., separate opinion), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
6. 629 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Tamm, J., concurring), aff'd, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
7. Although Judge Tamm participated in many first amendment cases, I have limited my focus to the
four cases in which he authored opinions and in which the Supreme Court subsequently granted review
and rendered its own decisions. I believe that this limitation is appropriate for several reasons. First,
authored opinions are more likely to reflect a judge's own views than are opinions in which the judge
merely joins. Second, Judge Tamm did not write on a clean slate even in most of his authored opinions, as
the cases decided by a lower federal court usually involve questions that are resolved through analysis and
application of Supreme Court precedent. Judge Tamm's opinions in these four cases, however, as sug-
gested by the Supreme Court's subsequent grants of review, were written largely in the absence of control-
ling Supreme Court doctrine. They therefore are more likely to reflect the first amendment philosophy
that Judge Tamm would have embraced in the absence of constraining Supreme Court precedents. Fi-
1585
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
In his opinions in these four cases, Judge Tamm took an extremely speech-
protective stance. His decisions never afforded less protection than that later
granted by the Supreme Court. Indeed, in two of the four cases, Judge Tamm
would have required a result that was later rejected by the Supreme Court as
being overly protective of freedom of expression.8
How could such a stance-a stance requiring frequent judicial invalidation of
the policies adopted by other government officials-be reconciled with a philoso-
phy of judicial restraint? In this brief article, I hope to demonstrate that despite
this apparent contradiction, Judge Tamm's speech-protective position was in fact
quite consistent with his general philosophy of judicial restraint, a philosophy
much more sophisticated than the label "conservative" would ever suggest.
I. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AS DEFERENCE TO MAJORITARIAN POLICYMAKING
A philosophy of judicial restraint requires that a judge take seriously the prin-
ciple of majoritarian government. 9 As an official who is both unelected and ten-
ured for life, a federal judge is far removed from political accountability. He
knows, or at least ought to know, that respect for the principle of majoritarian
government should cause him to hesitate before invalidating, on constitutional
grounds, the considered judgments of legislative or executive officials, whose de-
cisions are more likely to reflect popular sentiments.
Judge Tamm's approach to first amendment doctrine was clearly influenced
by a general respect for majoritarian decisionmaking. In Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC,10 he presaged the Supreme Court's ultimate ruling in the case by
upholding the "right to reply" components of the "fairness doctrine," according
nally, of course, the Supreme Court's selection of these cases for plenary review confirms that the cases
involved issues of unusual importance.
Judge Tamm wrote a number of significant first amendment opinions beyond the four discussed here.
E.g., Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
898 (1980); P.A.M. News Corp. v. Butz, 514 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d
1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 843 (1972); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 560-66 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Tamm, J., concurring); National
Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). Of particu-
lar note are Tavoulareas and Carlson, in which Judge Tamm addressed novel questions in the special
contexts of civil discovery and military affairs, resolving those questions in a manner consistent with
subsequently decided Supreme Court cases. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (first
amendment not violated by protective order precluding dissemination of discovered information); Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (first amendment does not prohibit regulation requiring prior approval for
distribution of petitions on military base). Judge Tamm's opinions in these various cases give me no
reason to doubt my conclusions concerning his basic first amendment philosophy.
8. Compare Buckley, 519 F.2d at 914-18 (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding
legislative limits on campaign contributions unconstitutional) with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59 (upholding
such limits); compare Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 13 (Tamm, J., separate opinion) (invalidating FCC attempt to
regulate indecent broadcasts) with Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738, 750-57 (finding regulation permissible under
Constitution and Federal Communications Act). See infra notes 19 & 40 and accompanying text; see also
infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing campaign funding program found unconstitutional by
Judge Tamm in Buckley but upheld by Supreme Court on appeal).
9. See generally Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases: Michael Perry's
Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REv. 587, 589-91, 663-64 (1985) (judicial review in indi-
vidual rights cases is counter-majoritarian and should be exercised with caution). For a discussion of the
various possible meanings of judicial restraint, see R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND RE-
FORM 198-222 (1985).
10. 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Tamm, J., separate opinion), aff'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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to which the Federal Communications Commission could require broadcast
licensees to air responses to "political editorials" and "personal attacks."' 1
Judge Tamm viewed the "right to reply" doctrines as ideologically neutral meas-
ures designed to further first amendment values:
The licensees' obligation to present both sides does not arise from the
factual truth or falsity of the broadcast, because in the application of
the Doctrine the ultimate determination of the merits of the issue will
be made by the general public for whose information, presumably, the
initial broadcast was originally made. "[The freedom of speech guar-
anteed by the First Amendment] presupposes that right conclusions
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection." 12
"[R]ather than limiting the [broadcaster's] right of free speech," he wrote, a
right to reply "recognizes and enforces the free speech right of the victim."' 13 In
the absence of an attempt to restrict the level of communication,14 Judge Tamm
believed that legislative and executive officials should not be precluded from
adopting evenhanded regulations designed to structure our system of freedom of
expression. 15
II. THE LIMITS OF DEFERENCE: SELF-GOVERNMENT AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
In Buckley v. Valeo,16 following the reasoning of his opinion in Red Lion,
Judge Tamm endorsed the financial disclosure provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act.17 "[D]isclosure increases the quantity of information reaching
the body politic," he explained, "and furthers the first amendment goal of 'pro-
ducing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs.' "18 He also
made it clear, however, that his deference to structural regulations, even if ideo-
logically neutral, would not extend to direct attempts by government to contract,
rather than expand, the level of free expression. In particular, he would not
11. 381 F.2d at 924.
12. Id. at 928-29 (modification in original) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
13. Id. at 924.
14. Judge Tamm observed "that [the broadcasters] are not prohibited from broadcasting any program
which [they] think suitable." Id. at 923; see id. at 929 ("no provision whatsoever requires the license
applicant to waive, forego, or sacrifice the liberty to discuss, when licensed, publicly all matters of public
concern").
15. See id. at 924 ("It would be strange indeed... if the grave concern for freedom of the press which
prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the government was
without power to protect that freedom.") (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945)).
Consistent with his belief that judicial restraint is necessary outside the first amendment context, Judge
Tamm summarily rejected an alternative argument of the challenger in Red Lion, an argument grounded
on the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 926-27 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529-30 (1964)
(Stewart, J., dissenting)).
16. 519 F.2d 821, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
17. 519 F.2d at 913-14. Although he approved the disclosure requirements in general, he would have
invalidated a disclosure provision that reached nonpartisan groups. Id.
18. Id. at 913 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392). On appeal, the Supreme Court generally agreed,
finding the disclosure requirements constitutionally permissible. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-84.
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defer to a decision of Congress to impose dollar limitations on either campaign
contributions or expenditures.19
Given his philosophy of judicial restraint, Judge Tamm was troubled about
making "judgments best left to Congress."' 20 With respect to freedom of expres-
sion, however, Judge Tamm believed that while the judiciary might well lack the
competence to establish a "hierarchy" of free speech values, 21 the other branches
of government were equally incompetent. "No one, not even Congress, can as-
certain the proper quantum of public discussion of issues; this type of paternal-
ism in the area of ideas and political communication is, or should be, completely
alien to our democratic system of government."' 22 Judge Tamm viewed his deci-
sion in Buckley not as substituting his judgment for that of Congress, but as
removing the power to restrict free expression from all branches of government,
those branches being equally without competence to "establish[ ] ... govern-
ment ceilings on first amendment activities."'23 In the first amendment arena,
Judge Tamm's philosophy of judicial restraint was part of a broader philosophy
of governmental restraint, and his sense of skepticism toward judicial policy
making was part of a broader skepticism about government in general.
Nevertheless, when a judge's skepticism about the policy making of legislative
and executive officials translates into a judicial willingness to invalidate their
decisions, the judge's commitment to the principle of majoritarian government is
put into question. The principle of majoritarian government, however, may
properly be understood to include a requirement of freedom of expression. 24 In
Buckley, Judge Tamm relied on this self-government rationale for protecting free
expression. He referred to political communication as "the foundation of all our
freedoms," 25 and quoted the famous words of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v.
California: "[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; .. .without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile;.., with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine. '26
Judge Tamm's general preference for deferring to majoritarian decisions outside
the first amendment context was fully consistent with Brandeis' admonition. If
freedom of expression "affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dis-
semination of noxious doctrine," it also affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the formulation of noxious government policy. Thus, with a strongly
19. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 914-18 (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On appeal, the
Supreme Court drew a distinction between campaign contributions and campaign expenditures, uphold-
ing the Act's limitations on the former but invalidating its limitations on the latter. 424 U.S. at 12-59.
20. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 914 (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 912; cf Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc) (Tamm, J., concurring in the result) ("second-guessing... by the judiciary [of the exercise of first
amendment rights] is both impossible and an unwarranted deviation from our constitutional scheme"),
cert denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
22. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 916 (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Id. at 921.
24. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRuST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-16
(1980); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
25. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 922 (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 917 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring));
see Red Lion, 381 F.2d at 928 (Tamm, J., separate opinion) ("The first amendment establishes an in-
formed electorate as the foundation stone of a democracy.").
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enforced freedom of expression, there might be little need for further judicial
checks on the majoritarian process.
III. THE REQUIREMENT OF IDEOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY
As his opinion in Buckley demonstrates, Judge Tamm believed that govern-
ment should not be permitted to impose direct restrictions on the quantity of
expressive activity. He also identified in that opinion another fundamental re-
quirement, which might be called a requirement of ideological neutrality. 27
Judge Tamm believed that government could not constitutionally adopt meas-
ures favoring certain speakers or viewpoints over others. As he had written ear-
lier, "[t]he basic concept of free speech is unfettered by any requirement that it
be exercised only by those with a 'right' viewpoint."'28 Under the doctrine he
had embraced in Red Lion, government could adopt structural regulations
designed to expand, rather than contract, the opportunity for free expression. In
doing so, however, the government would have to proceed in a manner that gave
no preference to particular speakers or to particular messages.
In Buckley, Judge Tamm relied upon this principle of neutrality in finding that
Congress had violated the Constitution by adopting a scheme of public financing
under the Federal Election Campaign Act.29 The Act provided for public fund-
ing of the presidential candidates of the two major political parties, but author-
ized funding for other presidential candidates only upon a showing of prior
electoral success.3 0 Consistent with his position in Red Lion, Judge Tamm ac-
knowledged that "Congress has the power to commit public resources to fund
electoral campaigns, ' 31 and suggested that he would have approved a system
through which public monies were distributed to particular candidates or partic-
ular parties on the basis of individual taxpayer choice. 32 Nevertheless, he found
that the Act, by taking "a myopic two-party view of the political spectrum,13 3
had "impermissibly depriv[ed] minor and new party presidential candidates of
their justifiable share of the public monies at a meaningful time."34 The Act thus
violated the requirement of neutrality by "discriminating against minor and new
party candidates. ' 35
27. I use the phrase "ideological neutrality" to describe this requirement, and "ideological partisan-
ship" to describe its violation. This dichotomy is somewhat different from the more commonly invoked
distinction between "content neutral" and "content based" regulation. See generally Stone, Content Reg-
ulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983). As the discussion below will
demonstrate, Judge Tamm's requirement of ideological neutrality would preclude most types of regulation
that might be said to involve purposeful governmental discrimination based on content, not only in the
narrow sense of viewpoint discrimination, but also in the sense of discrimination based on subject matter
or speaker identity. At least in theory, it would also preclude other regulation, even though content neu-
tral in purpose, if the regulation were directed to expression as such and if it had the effect of preferring
particular speakers or viewpoints over others.
28. Red Lion, 381 F.2d at 924 (Tamm, J., separate opinion).
29. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 918-20 (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 919.
31. Id. at 918.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 919.
34. Id. at 918.
35. Id. at 919. Judge Tamm grounded this conclusion on the equal protection component of the fifth
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In Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,36 Judge Tamm applied the requirement of ide-
ological neutrality to invalidate an attempt by the Federal Communications
Commission to regulate "indecent" radio broadcasts. 37 He noted that "when the
government, acting as a censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from
some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the
First Amendment strictly limits its power."38 In finding that the Commission
had entered "the forbidden realm of censorship,"' 39 Judge Tamm extended the
requirement of ideological neutrality beyond the context of expressly political
speech and suggested that the requirement operated more generally to prohibit
the selective regulation of expression on the basis of its content. He also rejected
an argument that the FCC's order was a permissible "channeling" mechanism,
designed not to prohibit but only to "channel" the offensive language to particu-
lar times of the day. "In fact," Judge Tamm concluded, "the Order is censor-
ship, regardless of what the Commission chooses to call it. ' '40
Pacifica involved an attempt by the government to evaluate expression on the
basis of its content, and Judge Tamm implied that sucA efforts should almost
never be tolerated. He broadly declared that "[a]ny examination of thought or
expression in order to prevent publication of objectionable material is censor-
ship."'41 In the evaluation of ideas and the language chosen to express them,
Judge Tamm believed that the forces of public debate and private choice were far
superior to any selection of values either by the FCC or by the federal judici-
ary.42 And in case of doubt, Judge Tamm's presumption was clear: "To
whatever extent we err, or the Commission errs in balancing its duties, it must be
in favor of preserving the values of free expression and freedom from govern-
mental interference in matters of taste."43
amendment's due process clause, but it was a conclusion drawn largely from first amendment considera-
tions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court disagreed with Judge Tamm's constitutional conclusion and found the
public funding scheme permissible. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-108.
36. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Tamm, J., separate opinion), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
37. Id. at 11. At issue was the broadcast of a George Carlin "comedy routine that was almost entirely
devoted to the use of seven four-letter words depicting sexual or excretory organs and activities." Id.
38. Id. at 16 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)). "Speech cannot be
stifled by the government," he wrote, "merely because it would draw an adverse reaction from the major-
ity of the people." Id. at 18.
39. Id. at 10-11.
40. Id. at 13. Judge Tamm grounded his decision in part on § 326 of the Federal Communications Act,
which denies the Commission any "power of censorship" and prohibits regulations that "interfere with
the right of free speech." 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982).
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed Judge Tamm's ruling, finding that the Commission's action
violated neither the Communications Act nor the Constitution. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738, 748-50,
41. Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 14 (Tamm, J., separate opinion).
42. See id. at 18 ("The Commission assumes that absent FCC action, filth will flood the airwaves....
[But the] corporate profit motive and the connection between advertising revenue and audience size sug-
gest that the dike will hold as long as the community remains actually offended by what it sees or hears.").
43. Id. The regulatory effort at issue in Pacifica arguably violated not only the requirement of ideologi-
cal neutrality, but also the independent principle that government cannot directly restrict the quantity of
expressive activity, even in the absence of ideological partisanship.
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IV. BALANCING THE CASE FOR DEFERENCE AGAINST
THE NEED FOR NEUTRALITY
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC44 (CBS), the D.C. Circuit addressed
the constitutionality of a government-mandated right of access to the radio and
television airwaves. Under section 312(a)(7) of the Federal Communications
Act,45 individual candidates for federal elective office have a right of reasonable
access for paid political broadcasts. Unlike the neutralizing "right to reply" doc-
trines considered in Red Lion, section 312(a)(7) had created an affirmative, ini-
tial right of access that applied without reference to whether a political opponent
had previously secured time.46 As interpreted by the FCC, the statute required
broadcasters to consider each request for access on an individualized basis, giv-
ing due regard to a variety of factors, including especially the candidate's "indi-
vidual needs." 47 Any denial of access was subject to FCC review, at which time
the Commission would decide whether the denial was reasonable.48 The D.C.
Circuit upheld the right of access provision against a first amendment challenge
by affected broadcasters. 49
Although Judge Tamm concurred in this ruling, he found the case extremely
difficult to resolve. The principle of Red Lion required deference to majoritarian
attempts to further the cause of freedom of expression, and section 312(a)(7)
enhanced the opportunity for important political speech. The FCC's standards,
however, created a risk that the Commission would violate the requirement of
ideological neutrality. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Tamm argued
that "broadcast regulation must be tailored to guard against government action
that is nonneutral, i.e., government action that, by purpose or effect, tends to
enhance the persuasive appeal of a particular speaker or viewpoint vis-a-vis op-
posing speakers or viewpoints."' 50 Judge Tamm feared that the presidentially
appointed FCC might consciously or subconsciously violate the requirement of
neutrality in policing the right of access created by section 312(a)(7), especially
in the context of presidential elections. 5x He was also concerned that a focus on
the "individual needs" of the candidates exacerbated this problem.52
Despite this danger, however, Judge Tamm could also see that "section
312(a)(7) makes a tremendous positive contribution to the cause of freedom of
expression." 53 He noted the importance of television and radio in modern cam-
44. 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
46. CBS, 629 F.2d at 9-14.
47. Id. at 17-21.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 23-25. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 453
U.S. at 394-97.
50. CBS, 629 F.2d at 31 (Tamm, J., concurring). In a footnote to this proposition, Judge Tamm ob-
served that "whatever its application in other contexts, the principle of neutrality is at its zenith in the
context of political speech." Id. at 31 n.8.
51. Id. at 32-33.
52. Id. Judge Tamm observed that the risk of ideological partisanship was much greater here than it
had been in Red Lion. Id. at 31-32; cf CBS, 453 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (FCC approach
"creates an impermissible risk that the Commission's evaluation of a given refusal by a licensee will be
biased-or will appear to be biased").
53. CBS, 629 F.2d at 33 (Tamm, J., concurring). Consistent with his position in Red Lion, he noted
that government is "permitted to further the general cause of freedom of expression." Id. at 30 n.6.
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paign efforts and emphasized the general importance of candidate speech in a
self-governed society.54 "To give increased play to ideas touching the very es-
sence of our democracy," he observed, "is a goal that surely lies near the heart of
the first amendment. '55
Thus, Judge Tamm was required to reconcile conflicting first amendment
principles in CBS-the deference principle he had endorsed in Red Lion on the
one hand, and the requirement of ideological neutrality on the other:
[S]ection 312(a)(7), as implemented by the Commission, stands pre-
cariously on the first amendment tightrope. It raises the serious danger
of nonneutral government action favoring one speaker or viewpoint
over another. Yet it also makes a great contribution to the cause of
encouraging an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discussion of is-
sues central to our system of government. 56
Stating that he "could not give effect to the statute's positive contribution to first
amendment values in the absence of adequate safeguards for controlling the dan-
ger of nonneutrality," 57 he found those safeguards in the FCC's implementation
of the right of access. In particular, Judge Tamm emphasized that the Commis-
sion was "strictly limited to the narrow role of overseeing broadcaster determi-
nations concerning access, determinations that are entitled to great deference
before the Commission."'5 8 He concluded that while the FCC's implementation
of section 312(a)(7) came "perilously close" to violating the first amendment, he
would uphold the agency's action as long as it maintained "a very limited 'over-
seer' role consistent with its obligation of careful neutrality."5 9
V. A "RESTRAINED" JUDICIAL ROLE?
Judicial restraint frequently implies judicial deference to the policy judgments
of elected and administrative officials. This deference certainly was an element of
Judge Tamm's first amendment philosophy. Thus, he was quite willing to up-
hold structural regulations designed to foster freedom of expression. Efforts by
government to restrict expression or to pursue ideologically partisan objectives,
however, did not warrant the deference he ordinarily gave to the policy judg-
ments of the popular branches. Although Judge Tamm was skeptical of his own
ability as a judge to determine the propriety of such efforts, his skepticism ex-
tended to other government officials as well. As a result, his implementation of
judical restraint in the area of first amendment doctrine could not mean unques-
tioned deference to the judgments of elected and administrative officials. 60
54. Id. at 33-34.
55. Id. at 34.
56. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
57. Id.
58. Id. Judge Tamm also noted that the equal time provision of § 315 of the Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1982), served "as an important safety net by mitigating the effect of any nonneutrality that
might creep into the § 312(a)(7) decisionmaking process." Id. at 34 n.22.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Three of the four cases discussed here involved broadcast regulation, and one could argue that this
might color the first amendment philosophy that is reflected in Judge Tamm's opinions. But his position
concerning structural regulation was essentially the same in Buckley, a nonbroadcasting case, as it was in
Red Lion and CBS. Likewise, Buckley was the case in which Judge Tamm first applied his theories
concerning restrictions on expression and the requirement of ideological neutrality. His opinion in
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CBS demonstrates that Judge Tamm's first amendment philosophy was not
always easy to apply. Nevertheless, what emerges from his opinions in Red
Lion, Buckley, and Pacifica, as well as CBS, is a refreshingly simple vision of the
first amendment: government may adopt ideologically neutral measures
designed to expand the range of expression, but it may not directly limit the
quantity of expressive activity, and it may not adopt regulations that are partisan
in their treatment of different speakers, different viewpoints, or different uses of
language. 61 By contrast, the Supreme Court has developed an elaborate codifica-
tion of first amendment doctrine, one that includes numerous categories and sub-
types of unprotected or only partially protected expression. As Professor
Merritt has observed, the Court has promulgated "increasingly complex first
amendment categories and catchwords. First amendment lawyers today speak
of public and private figures, actual malice or negligence, the four part Central
Hudson test, the three step O'Brien analysis, and type one, two, and three public
fora." 62
Because Judge Tamm sat as a court of appeals judge, he encountered only a
few freedom of expression cases of first impression; it is impossible to know how
he might have responded to the vast array of cases that have reached the
Supreme Court. 63 Nonetheless, it seems clear that he endorsed a strong but sim-
ple reading of the first amendment, one that precluded legislative abridgments of
expressive rights but that required little in the way of judicial policy making.
When this interpretation of the first amendment is compared with the doctrine
currently embraced by the Supreme Court, it becomes evident that the Supreme
Court is willing to tolerate significantly more governmental regulation than
Judge Tamm's position would permit. But the Court upholds such governmen-
tal action only selectively, using a process of judicial decisionmaking that draws
fine distinctions based upon the type of regulation involved and the perceived
values and harms of various types of expression."
It may be fair to ask which view of the first amendment, Judge Tamm's or the
Pacifica did expand the requirement of ideological neutrality significantly, but surely the speech-protective
position that he endorsed in that case would have been applied with no less rigor outside the context of
broadcasting-a context in which the government sometimes has been permitted to regulate in a manner
that would not be permitted elsewhere. Compare Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01 (upholding "right to
reply" components of "fairness doctrine") with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) (invalidating Florida "right to reply" statute that granted political candidates newspaper space
to answer criticism).
61. Note that each of these cases involved governmental regulation directed to expressive conduct as
such, as contrasted with regulation directed to conduct generally but having an incidental effect on expres-
sion. Judge Tamm apparently believed that government must have greater leeway in adopting the latter
type of regulation. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 608-22 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., with Tamm, MacKinnon, Bork & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that general
ban on camping in designated parks could constitutionally be applied to camping that constituted expres-
sive part of demonstration otherwise protected by first amendment), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
62. Merritt, Book Review, 3 CONST. COMM. 234, 234 (1986) (citations omitted). See generally G.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 972-1462 (1 1th ed. 1985).
63. If I were to speculate on this question, I would guess that Judge Tamm might have tended toward
an "absolutist" position akin to that often associated with Justice Black. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-80
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
64. Several recent books address the Supreme Court's first amendment doctrine and related theoretical
issues. E.g., L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984); M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF
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Supreme Court's, is more "conservative" and "restrained." I think I know how
Judge Tamm would have felt.
EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY(1982); W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984).
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